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 USURY REDUX: 
NOTES ON THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY BY JOHN T. NOONAN 
 
 
  I summarize the key points of the scholastic theory of usury following The Scholastic 
Analysis of Usury by John T. Noonan. Usury is the sin of taking interest on a loan without a just 
title. According to Scholastic moral theology, interest on loans may be justified by the extrinsic 
titles to damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, i.e. for losses incurred or for profits lost. 
Implications of this teaching are discussed with regard to other contracts, such as partnerships, 
the census contract, bills of exchange and “dry exchange,” insurance contracts, and the so-
called triple contract. Also discussed are the changes in the practices of confessors that occurred 
between 1822 and 1836. 
 
JEL Classification: B11, Z12 
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  Last year I wrote a working paper called “Money for Nothing: The Sin of Usury,” in which I 
summarized the teaching of the Catholic Church on usury and suggested that what appeared to 
be a change to the teaching on usury was in fact merely a change in practice justified by 
fundamental changes in the economy over the last five hundred years. That essay errs only in 
that it fails to recognize the complexity of economic life in the late middle ages, especially that in 
northern Italy in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, and the depth of understanding 
of the Scholastic theologians on economic matters, especially as they pertain to usury. My only 
defense is that I am neither a theologian nor a historian, and it was my awareness of these 
shortcomings that prevented me from submitting it to a journal for peer review. I am still neither 
a theologian nor a historian, but sometimes a good book can go a long way towards filling the 
gaps. In this case, the book is The Scholastic Analysis of Usury by John T. Noonan (1957). This 
masterpiece of scholarship surveys the development of the teaching on usury in Scholastic 
theology and canon law. This essay is a reappraisal of my original thesis in light of this book, 
and page citations refer to it unless specified otherwise. 
 
“Notorious Public Usurers” 
  It is essential to any discussion of usury to identify the subject of the Church’s objection. 
“Notorious public usurers” were public moneylenders, typically Jews and lombards,
1 who loaned 
                                                       
1 Cf. Noonan, p. 34. money at interest rates of 35%.
2 Noonan tells us that merchant bankers who provided credit at 
moderate interest rates and who paid modest interest on deposits, while occasionally viewed with 
suspicion, were not on the same social footing as usurers.
3  Importantly, interest rates charged by 
merchant bankers were substantially lower than those of public usurers.
4 As the economy 
developed, other contracts similar to loans emerged, such as the census and the triple contract, 
that provided credit to borrowers at interest rates of 5%. These contracts were accepted as licit by 
moral theologians and Catholic authorities did not object to the provision of such credit at those 
interest rates, though they would object when those contracts were abused to disguise usury. 
While some of the more rigorous theologians occasionally objected, neither Catholic authorities 
nor the public conscience were disturbed by the moderate interest rates. On this point, Noonan 
suggests that there may have been a real divergence on the morality of exchange between the 
leading theologians and the merchants.
5 
  Why is interest paid on a loan? There are several possible reasons: for the use of money; 
because of the bargaining power of the lender; for the opportunity cost of the lender; for 
expected inflation; for default risk; or for the labors and expenses of the lender. Usury is 
committed when compensation is demanded for the use of money itself, either as fees or as 
interest payments. The lender commits usury when he demands more in interest payments and 
fees than is morally justified, and he is able to do this when he is in a superior bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the borrower. This can easily occur in loans to the poor, who are forced to 
borrow while the lender does not need to lend, but it may also occur in loans for large 
commercial enterprises that can only be financed by one or a handful of large banks, who are 
then in a position to demand more in fees and interest than is warranted by any just titles. 
Noonan neatly summarizes the teaching: “usury, the act of taking profit on a loan without a just 
title, is sinful.”
6 
                                                       
2 Cf. p. 294. 
3 Cf. pp. 191-92. 
4 Cf. p. 192. 
5 Cf. p. 192. 
6 p. 400.   Scholastic theology traditionally recognizes two titles for which compensation may be paid 
on a loan: lucrum cessans (“profit ceasing”) and damnum emergens (“loss occurring”). Interest 
paid as compensation for the opportunity cost of the lender, expected inflation, default risk, or 
for the labors and expenses of the lender listed falls within these two titles. Such interest 
payments are morally permissible and not usurious.  Compensation for opportunity cost is 
justified under the extrinsic title lucrum cessans, provided there were real opportunities to invest 
that were forgone by the lender. Compensation for expected inflation is justified by the title to 
damnum emergens, but was generally unknown during the middle ages, as inflation is a modern 
phenomenon. Of course, the theologians were well aware that prices fluctuate depending on 
economic conditions—even recognizing that they were jointly determined by supply and 
demand
7—but such fluctuations were neither predictable nor persistently upward as they are 
today. Compensation for default risk could be justified under damnum emergens, but was not 
allowed at the time, since debts were not excused in the case of default and the obligation to 
repay the loan remained with the borrower. Debts could not be wiped away by declaring 
bankruptcy. Compensation for the labors and expenses of the lender are also justified by the 
extrinsic title of the damnum emergens. 
  The title to lucrum cessans is nearly identical to the economic concept of opportunity cost, 
though there is an important distinction. Lucrum cessans is the claim to profit lost by forgoing an 
investment opportunity; opportunity cost is the cost of forgoing the next best alternative, which 
may not necessarily be an investment opportunity. For example, it may be the case that I have no 
profitable investment opportunities, but I would like to spend my money taking my family on an 
expensive vacation. If, instead of spending the money, I choose to lend it, I must forgo my 
vacation. In this example, the opportunity cost to lending is the value of the vacation that I would 
have otherwise taken, but there is no lost profit, so it seems there is no claim to the title of 
lucrum cessans. Whether the meaning of lucrum cessans can or should be broadened to account 
for this possibility, or whether there is some other title under which I could claim compensation 
in this example, is a matter for theologians to decide, though it does not seem that any 
compensation is justified under either the title of lucrum cessans or damnum emergens. 
 
                                                       
7 Noonan notes that “Henry of Hesse [d. 1397] expressly declares that prices are determined by the joint influence of 
supply and demand.” p. 84. Opportunity Cost, Inflation, and Default Risk in the Middle Ages 
  My original thesis was that moderate interest is justifiable in the modern economy as 
compensation to the lender for opportunity cost, inflation, and risk of default, as well as the costs 
of administering the loan, but these costs may not have been significant in the economic 
conditions that prevailed in a typical medieval economy. If this is the case, then little or no 
interest could be justified, and any interest charged would be excessive and usurious. Noonan 
provides evidence that supports this thesis. 
  The practice in extending loans during the middle ages was to presume that there was no the 
title to lucrum cessans unless there was evidence to the contrary, and Noonan provides some 
evidence that suggests that the opportunity cost of lending was zero in many cases. First, he 
notes that churches and monasteries often had large sums of money on hand: “many churches 
and monasteries were under a constant pressure to find suitable investments for their funds. . . . 
The papacy itself often had large idle sums on deposit in banks.”
8 Second, he tells us that lending 
at zero interest would not have prohibited investment, since all such institutions could have 
entered into partnerships (societas) if profitable investment opportunities existed. The societas 
was “a great and universal form of licit investment in commerce throughout medieval Europe.”
9 
Noonan also tells us that, contrary to what the Marxists would have us believe, there was no 
objection to seeking profit in Catholic moral theology
10 and that there was no moral objection to 
partnerships in which one partner supplied the labor while the other supplied the capital.
11 With 
no moral impediment to seeking profit and a perfectly a legitimate investment vehicle, the most 
plausible explanation why large sums of money would remain idle is because no profitable 
investment opportunities existed. The existence of such opportunities, of course, depends on 
economic conditions, so this would not have always been the case—it does not seem to be the 
case among the merchant-bankers of Florence, Venice, and Genoa in the later middle ages—but 
this evidence suggests that it was the case in the earlier middle ages and perhaps in other regions 
even in the later middle ages. 
                                                       
8 Noonan, p. 14. 
9 Noonan, p. 133. 
10 “It must be clearly understood that there is no scholastic opposition to profit as such.” p. 32. 
11 “Often one partner will invest money alone, the other labor alone. . .” Noonan, p. 134.   Inflation, by which is meant an increase in all prices, is a phenomenon of the modern 
economy. The persistent upward trend in inflation did not begin in the United States until 1960, 
and predictable annual inflation rates of 2-3% began in the early 1980s. Perhaps the earliest 
instance of widespread inflation would be that of Spain in response to the influx of gold from its 
American colonies. Persons living in the middle ages would not have expected the general price 
level to rise, but they were well aware that prices fluctuated with economic conditions, and 
recognized that such changes in prices could bring losses to creditors. As an example of this, 
Scholastic theologians recognized a title to venditio sub dubio in their treatment of credit sales. 
In a credit sale, a good is received today and paid for at a later date. The title to venditio sub 
dubio is a title of the creditor to a receive a higher payment at the later date because the value of 
the goods sold increases at the time of payment. A credit sale is a single transaction, but it can be 
thought of as two separate transactions: the seller loans money to the buyer, who then buys the 
good and pays off the loan at a later date. The difference between the prices of the good today 
and at the future date is effectively the interest on the loan, so such contracts were open to abuse 
by the unscrupulous. In In civitate, Pope Alexander III recognized the title to venditio sub dubio 
as licit when there was real doubt as to the future value of the goods, though Pope Urban III 
clarified that credit sales at much higher prices were to be considered usurious.
12 While 
theologians at the time did not apply this title to loans (mutuum), the title to venditio sub dubio 
clearly recognizes that both that prices could change with economic conditions and that when 
such changes caused or were expected to cause a loss to the creditor he had a title to 
compensation. The title to venditio sub dubio is due to a loss incurred by the lender and falls 
under the broader title of damnum emergens. While this title was it was not generally applied to 
loans, the fact that the popes recognized that usury could be committed in credit sales indicates 
that they recognized the connection between the two types of transactions, so it is plausible that 
what could be claimed in one transaction could be claimed in the other. 
  The risk of default presents a real cost to the lender, and these risks are significantly different 
in the modern economy. Scholastic theologians carefully distinguish between the two types of 
risk of default: perticulum sortis is the risk faced by a lender who agrees to forgive the debt if the 
debtor fails to repay because of some misfortune; perticulum mutui, as Noonan calls it, is the risk 
                                                       
12 See Noonan, pp. 90-91. faced by a lender who does not agree to forgive the debt in the event of misfortune, instead the 
debt.
13 Noonan explains that perticulum sortis is the risk faced by an insurer and is generally 
favored by theologians as a title for compensation, presumably falling under the title damnum 
emergens; perticulum mutui is the risk faced by a lender who does not agree to forgive the debt, 
and this not generally recognized as a valid title.
14 
  The consequences of nonrepayment of a loan changed dramatically with the abolition of 
slavery, effectively changing the risk of default faced by lenders from perticulum mutui to 
perticulum sortis.  In the modern economy, a debtor in default may declare bankruptcy and have 
his debts substantially reduced or wiped away, at the cost of the creditor. In the event of 
bankruptcy, the creditor is forced to forgive the debt; the risk is that of perticulum sortis. This 
was not so in the middle ages, where the debtor remained in debt. Noonan summarizes the 
argument of St. Bernardine against compensation for risk of default: “since the debtor always 
remains obliged to indemnify if he defaults, the peril of the creditor is not real.”
15 The debtor 
does not owe compensation prior to default, but, in the event default, he remains liable not only 
for the full amount of the loan, but also for any legal expenses incurred by the creditor in 
recovering what is rightfully his. A debtor could end up debtors’ prison or as an indentured 
servant or slave. The option to declare bankruptcy was not available to debtors at that time, and 
as a result the costs arising from risk of default is significantly different now than it was to 
creditors in the middle ages. 
  The perticulum mutui faced by creditors is mitigated by several factors, and the costs 
represented by this risk would depend both on the likelihood of these events and how such events 
were treated in law and practice. In the middle ages it was common to attach a pledge to loan, 
either in the form of collateral or as a guarantee by a third party, and this would significantly 
reduce the potential costs faced by the lender in the case of default. Noonan tells us that pledges 
demanded by public usurers were usually “worth much more than the loan.”
16 In the event of 
default, the creditor either receives property worth more than the loan itself or a payment by a 
                                                       
13 Noonan, p. 129. 
14 Noonan, p. 129. 
15 Noonan, p. 131. 
16 Noonan, p. 129. third party for the amount of the principal. For loans on which the creditor did not demand a 
pledge, the debtor would remain in debt even in the case of default, so the creditor would face 
only the risk that the debtors would either flee or die before the loan was repaid, and the potential 
costs to the creditor of the risks of death or flight of a debtor would depend both on the contract 
itself and how such contracts were treated in law. For instance, when debt was inherited by the 
children or other relatives of the debtor in the event of death or flight, the actual risk faced by the 
creditor would have been mitigated and even insignificant. 
  Scholastic theology has long recognized the validity of titles for compensation for lucrum 
cessans and damnum emergens, but the amount of compensation that is justifiable under these 
titles has changed dramatically with the changes in economic conditions. Where there was once a 
presumption against lucrum cessans, the plentitude of investment opportunities in the modern 
economy justifies a presumption in favor of it; compensation for the cost of inflation to the 
lender is justified by the title to venditio sub dubio; and the abolition of slavery has effectively 
transformed the risk of default from the invalid title to perticulum mutui to the valid title to 
perticulum sortis. While the changes in the economy left the Scholastic teaching unaffected, they 
did bring about changes in the practice of confessors, and it is these changes that are often 
mistaken for a change in the Church’s teaching on usury. 
 
Changes in the Practice of Confessors 
  The change in the practice of confessors came about through a series of sixteen decrees made 
by the Holy Office between 1822 and 1836 in response to questions about the absolution of 
penitents. Prior to this time, the practice had been to withhold absolution from penitents until 
they restore any gains that they had made in lending that were not justified by titles to either 
lucrum cessans or damnum emergens. It is apparent from the questions that, in practice, the title 
to lucrum cessans at that time could only be claimed with reference to an actual investment 
opportunity. The questions asked of the Holy Office establish that it is permissible for confessors 
to absolve penitents who receive the interest permitted by civil law without making restitution. 
All information on the decrees listed here are from Noonan and sources quoted by him. I include 
them here because these decrees are essential to understanding how the practice of confessors 
changed: 
 [Decree I. In 1822, a woman of Lyons “gave her capital to certain persons with the 
agreement that they pay her the interest rate prescribed by civil law.” She appealed her 
confessor’s refusal of absolution and the sacraments.] The Holy Office, judging the appeal, 
declared that “a response will be given at a suitable time”; that meanwhile, however, 
restitution was not necessary; and that the woman might receive the sacraments. 
[Decree II. In 1830, the confessors of Rennes were absolving penitents who had lent their 
money to businessmen at interest with the proviso that they were willing to submit to a papal 
decision on the matter and make restitution should it become necessary. The Bishop of 
Rennes asked the Holy See two questions: should the practices of these confessors could be 
approved? and should the more rigid confessors should conform to these practice?] Pius VIII, 
after consultation with the Holy Office, personally replied “To the first question, they are not 
to be disturbed. To the second, it is answered in the first.” 
[Decree III.] A perplexed vicar-general asked, “Whether a confessor sins, who sends away 
in good faith a penitent, who demands from a loan the gain allowed by the civil law, apart 
from any extrinsic title of lucrum cessans or damnum emergens or extraordinary danger?” 
[The Holy Office responded] “Non esse inquietandum” (“They are not to be disturbed”) 
provided he is ready to obey a decision of the Holy See.
17 
[Decree IV.] A troubled theologian, Denavit, . . . declared “The undersigned writer, thinking 
it licit by no contract to withdraw from the doctrine of Benedict XIV, denies sacramental 
absolution to priests who contend that the law of the prince is sufficient title for taking 
something beyond the sum lent apart from lucrum cessans or damnum emergens.” In answer 
to his question if his conduct was, then, too severe toward these priests, the Holy Office 
again replied “Non esse inquietandos.” 
[Decrees V-XI. Six more decrees confirmed these responses, and two more in response to 
questions from the Bishop of Viviers affirm the permissibility of the interest rate authorized 
by civil law on loans to businessmen.] 
[Decree XII. The monks of the collegiate chapter of Locarno could not find a suitable 
investment at more than 2.5%, and asked (1) if they could lend the money at the legal rate of 
interest; (2) if this permission could be extended to all churches, monasteries, and wards in 
                                                       
17 De Vie, Litterae monitoriae, in Migne, Theologiae cursus completes, XVI, col. 1065. Quoted in Noonan, p. 379. similar positions; and (3)  “whether such contracts are sufficiently justified by civil laws and 
forms which now generally ratify them and order them fulfilled, and also by the common and 
tacit consent of the people which , by now an ancient custom, seems to substitute these 
contracts as more convenient in place of others more involved and difficult?” The Holy 
Office responded “Non esse inquietandum.”] 
[Decrees XIII-XV. Refer questioners to earlier decrees; decree XV notes that “good faith is 
always supposed” in those taking interest on the grounds of the legal title.] 
[Decree XVI.] The Bishop of Viviers asked what attitude he should adopt toward those of 
his clergy who preached that the legal title was clearly valid, omitting any reference of the 
possibility of a future decision of the Holy See. Cardinal Gregorio, the Grand Peniteniary, 
wrote to him explaining the intention of the earlier decisions: “The Sacred Penitentiary 
wished to define nothing at all about the question, debated by theologians, of the title derived 
from the law of the prince; but only to provide a norm which confessors might safely follow 
in regard to penitents who take a moderate profit determined by the law of the prince, with 
good faith and ready to accept the commands of the Holy See. 
Those, therefore, who in preaching teach absolutely that it is licit to profit from a loan by title 




  Noonan notes that these decisions were met with considerable controversy among 
theologians. Did the civil law create a just title to interest other than lucrum cessans and damnum 
emergens?  Or did the prevailing rates of interest in law and in the marketplace effectively 
provide a common estimation of the values of those titles, relieving penitents of the burden of 
calculating such titles according to their private circumstances? 
  Defenders of the scholastic tradition pointed out that “the general permission to take interest 
can be understood as an extension of the title to lucrum cessans and need involve no 
abandonment of old principles.”
 19 Noonan also notes that  
                                                       
18 Noonan, pp. 378-81. 
19 Noonan, p. 377. “Their contention had particular cogency in view of the enormous quickening of economic 
life at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Industrial Revolution, already in full 
progress in England, now began to affect the continent as well, and the Holy Office decrees 
coincide with the acceleration of its influence there.”
20 
There is a recognition at the time that lending in the emerging economy entailed an opportunity 
cost and entitled on to a claim for lucrum cessans; the moral analysis of lending changed from a 
presumption against the existence of a profitable investment opportunity to a presumption in 
favor of one, and the practice of confessors adjusted accordingly. Interestingly, these decrees 
also coincide with the abolition of slavery— outlawed by Great Britain in 1833—though the 
implications of this for the risk of lending and the transformation of risk of default do not seem 
to be recognized either by Noonan or by the authors he surveys. 
 
Vix Pervenit and the Teaching on Usury 
  The last ex professo statement on usury by a pope was the encyclical Vix pervenit, 
promulgated on November 1, 1745 by Benedict XIV, about 75 years prior to the changes in the 
practices of confessors. This encyclical affirms the traditional teaching on usury. Regarding 
usury, the pope states  
“The nature of the sin called usury has its proper place and origin in a loan contract. This 
financial contract between consenting parties demands, by its very nature, that one return to 
another only as much as he has received. The sin rests on the fact that sometimes the creditor 
desires more than he has given. Therefore he contends some gain is owed him beyond that 
which he loaned, but any gain which exceeds the amount he gave is illicit and usurious.” (Vix 
pervenit, 3.I) 
The meaning of “gain” here does not prohibit any interest, for in the same encyclical, Benedict 
clarifies that 
“By these remarks, however, We do not deny that at times together with the loan contract 
certain other titles-which are not at all intrinsic to the contract-may run parallel with it. From 
these other titles, entirely just and legitimate reasons arise to demand something over and 
above the amount due on the contract. Nor is it denied that it is very often possible for 
                                                       
20 Noonan, p. 377. someone, by means of contracts differing entirely from loans, to spend and invest money 
legitimately either to provide oneself with an annual income or to engage in legitimate trade 
and business. From these types of contracts honest gain may be made.” (Vix pervenit, 3.III) 
There is no title intrinsic to a loan for compensation beyond the principal, i.e. no compensation is 
due for the use of money itself. Interest and other fees, if they are charged, must be justified by 
titles extrinsic to the loan. 
  There are two important points about the wording of the encyclical. First, the reference to the 
extrinsic titles situates the teaching within the framework of Scholastic theology; it cannot be 
interpreted apart from that tradition. Second, the fact that the titles to lucrum cessans and 
damnum emergens are not explicitly named allows for a flexibility, either in the definition of 
these categories or in allowing for the possibility there may exist other titles for which 
compensation may be justified, depending on economic conditions. However, the situation of the 
encyclical within the Scholastic tradition, leaves little doubt that the traditional titles are valid. 
  The changes in the practice of confessors allowed the mutuum to become the common form 
of credit in Catholic areas of the world. Prior to these changes, other contracts had been used in 
order to avoid the suspicion of usury, though these contracts, in their similarity to loans, were 
open to the same abuse. Theologians had long recognized the potential for abuse in census 
contracts, foreign exchange contracts, and the so-called triple contract, and various Popes had 
condemned the use of such contracts to disguise usury. 
 
Cum onus and the Census Contract 
  A census contract is an exchange of money for the fruits of productive property, originally 
attached to a piece of land. The seller of a census owns the property and by extension the fruits 
of it, and the buyer purchases these fruits. While the census is a sale, it is similar to a loan, in 
which the seller, who receives money, is the borrower, and the buyer, who receives an annual 
return, is the lender. Unlike a mutuum, the returns to a census were not considered interest and 
the contract carried ordinarily carried little suspicion of usury. However, as theologians probed 
the basis of the census they recognized its similarity to a loan, and that a census contract could be 
written in such a way so as to be formally indistinguishable form a loan. As such, the theologians 
recognized that the census contract could be used to disguise usury.   The concept of the census was expanded over the centuries as theologians question its 
foundations. Could any productive property be used as a basis? Could the property be mobile? 
Could a census be specified in terms of the value of the goods to be returned instead of the goods 
themselves? Could the seller of the census be guarantee a constant return, such as the average 
value of the fruits of the property, instead of a variable return? Could a census be based on the 
tax revenue of a State? Could a census be redeemable by the seller? To all of these questions, the 
Scholastics ultimately answered yes. A census did not have to be based on land and could be 
based on the tax returns of a State or on a person; the returns could be specified as constant 
monetary returns; and the census could be redeemable by the seller. The redemption by the seller 
allowed him to repurchase the rights to the property, or, effectively, to pay off the loan. A census 
based on a person specifying constant monetary returns that is redeemable by the seller is nearly 
indistinguishable from a mutuum, though subtle differences would remain in how  these contracts 
were treated in law. What would if the base was no longer productive? In particular, what would 
happen with a personal census if the person became incapacitated and no longer able to work? 
Noonan tells us that “Alexander Lombard, Joannes Andrae, and Panormitanus make explicit 
what is probably the common assumption: the purchaser of the census runs the risk of sterility of 
the census base.”
21 Where this distinction was maintained in law, the two contracts would differ 
in the event that a person became unable to work: if he had sold a census based on his person, 
then he would not be obligated to make a return to the buyer; if he had received a mutuum, then 
he would be obligated to pay interest to his creditor in spite of his condition. 
  In order to curb abuses of the census contract, Pope Pius V issued the bull Cum onus on 
January 19, 1569. Noonan summarizes the encyclical: 
“The Pope begins by saying that the census contracts daily celebrated not only do not keep 
the limits set by his predecessors, but show a manifest contempt for the divine law. He then 
declares that no census may be constituted except on a fruitful, immobile good, specifically 
designated to pay the census returns. He invalidates all guarantees of census by the seller. He 
orders that every census be redeemable by the seller, and that, on the other hand, no buyer 
force an unwilling seller to redeem them. In a word, the personal, the guaranteed, and 
                                                       
21 Noonan, p. 158. mutually redeemable census all are outlawed. All contracts not observing these rules, the 
Pope says, are ‘to be considered usurious.’”
22 
Navarrus, a leading theologian and defender of the bull, believed that personal, redeemable 
census was a violation of natural law, but the majority of theologians of the day rejected this 
opinion. Noonan tells us that 
“The majority of theologians . . . held that the principal requirements set forth by the Pope 
were matters of positive, not natural, law. A positive promulgation by the Pope had to be 
received by either the governments or the common practice of a country in order for it to 
retain the force of law. No country received Cum onus. St. Alphonsus Liguori states that the 
bull had no force in southern Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, Germany, or even Rome itself.”
23 
Comments by Navarrus show that he opposed the personal, redeemable, guaranteed census 
because such a contract, so similar to the mutuum, was a cause for scandal and a method of 
“hiding usury.”
24 Thus, while the bull did not have its intended effect on law, the public 
recognition by the Pope that the personal, redeemable, guaranteed census was nearly identical to 
a loan and could be used to disguise usury is an opinion that seems to have been accepted by 
everyone. 
 
In eam and Dry Exchange 
  A bill of exchange is an exchange of a quantity of currency at one time and place for another 
currency at another time and place. A bill of exchange can be thought of as two separate 
contracts: a loan of a certain quantity of domestic currency today and an agreement to exchange 
domestic currency for foreign currency at a future date, which is known today as a forward 
contract. Additionally, there is the fact that the exchanges take place in two different locations, 
which introduces the costs and risk of transportation of the currency into the moral analysis, 
though a bank would not ordinarily have to transport the currency in order to complete the 
transaction. 
                                                       
22 Noonan, p. 237. 
23 Noonan, p. 238. 
24 Noonan, p. 238.   A loan can be effected through the use of two bills of exchange in what is known as dry 
exchange. For example, a person exchanges $100 in New York today with a bank for 115£ to be 
paid in London six months from now. A second bill could then be written for 115£ to be paid by 
the person in London six months from now in exchange for $130 to be received by the bank in 
one year. Note that there is no restriction that the date that the contract is written must coincide 
with any of the dates of exchange, nor is it necessary that the person travel to London since the 
155£ paid by the person in the second bill cancels out the 115£ received by him from the first. 
Both bills of exchange could be written a the same time, and the net effect of the two bills is for 
the person to receive $100 from the bank today in exchange for $130 to be paid in one year, or a  
one year loan at 30% interest. 
  On January 28, 1571, Pope Pius V directed the encyclical letter In eam against the use of 
foreign exchange contracts to disguise usury through dry exchange. Noonan summarizes the 
teaching of the encyclical 
“The bull declares that the useful and necessary operation of exchange has been abused and 
made usurious by some avaricious persons. The Pope, therefore, condemns all dry exchange, 
by which, he says, are meant contracts taking the form of exchange in which either bills of 
exchange are not sent to another place or, if they are sent, are not paid there, but return empty 
to be paid by the seller of the bill in the same place, as it was agreed or at least certainly 
intended by both parties. In addition to these condemnations, the Pope, to take away any 
opportunity for sin, prohibits exchanges made to any but the next fair, and also the fixing of 
standard interest rates. The penalties for violating the bull are to be the canons against 
usurers.”
25 
The competitive nature of modern foreign exchange markets has eliminated the possibility of dry 
exchange in developed economies. In such markets, interest rates and exchange rates are 
fundamentally related by the covered interest parity condition 
(1 + i) = (F / S) (1 + j) 
Here i is the domestic interest rate, j the foreign interest rate, F is the exchange rate on a forward 
contract, and S is the exchange rate in the spot market. When the exchange rate on the forward 
contract is equal to that of the spot market, F = S and the condition implies that the foreign 
                                                       
25 Noonan, p. 333. interest rate must be equal to the domestic interest rate. Competitive markets limit the interest 
that can be made on two bills of exchange to the ordinary domestic rate of interest. 
 
Detestabilia avaritia and the Triple Contract 
  The “Triple Contract” or contractus trinus is a combination of three contracts that effectively 
transforms a partnership into a loan. The first contract was the societas or partnership itself, in 
which an investor would invest his capital with a partner. Insurance had arisen in the fourteenth 
century in conjunction with maritime trade. The second contract was an insurance contract in 
which the partner insured the investor’s investment against loss: the partner would be liable for 
the investment should the partnership fail. The third contract was a second insurance contract, in 
which the investor exchanged the variable returns of the partnership for a guaranteed fixed 
return. Through the use of these three contracts, the investor has effectively become a lender and 
the partner a borrower: the investment is the principal lent in exchange for a fixed return, and the 
borrower is liable for the full amount of the principal in the event of default. When the 
transaction is understood in these terms, the insurance contracts are properly called swaps in 
financial markets and the second contract—insurance on the principal in a loan—is a credit 
default swap. In the sixteenth century, the triple contract is commonly called “the 5 per cent 
contract” in reference to its typical interest rate, but this term comes to refer to the census 
contracts in the seventeeth century. The triple contract is successfully defended and promoted by 
John Eck, who wrote his Tractatus de contractu quique de centum  in 1515,
26 and it is rapidly 
adopted and popularized throughout Europe in the sixteenth century. 
  Like the census, the contractus trinus becomes popular in part because it avoids suspicion of 
usury, and like the census, theologians recognize both its similarity to the mutuum and the 
potential abuse of it to disguise usury. It is against such abuse that the Pope Sixtus V directs the 
bull Detestabilia avaritia in 1586. The pope 
“damns and proscribes all and any contracts, agreements and pacts afterwards to be made, by 
which it is guaranteed to persons giving money, animals, or any other things in the name of a 
societas that, even if in some fortuitous case, disaster, loss, or lack happens to occur, the 
principal or capital will always be safe and restored entire by the partner receiving it . . . . We 
                                                       
26 Noonan, p. 209. decree that contracts, agreements, and pacts of this kind are thought to be illicit and 
usurious.”
27 
The pope then declares that those who continue those who use such contracts to exact either the 
capital invested or the fixed returns on that investment after the capital has whole or in part 
perished or been lost by a fortuitous event incur the penalties against manifest usurers and 
moneylenders. It is important to note that the risk faced by the partner or borrower in this 
contract is perticulum mutui and not the perticulum sortis faced by borrowers today, who have 
the protection of bankruptcy. 
  The question at hand is whether the indemnification against loss to the investor by his partner 
effectively destroys the partnership. In order for a partnership or societas  to exist, is it necessary 
for every partner to bear at least some of the risk? Or is it possible that one can indemnify 
himself against all risk and yet remain a partner? The majority of theologians at the time agreed 
that it was possible for a partner to indemnify himself against all risk and yet remain a partner, 
and thus the matter pertained to positive, not natural law. The prevailing opinion is that of 
Conrad Summenhart, summarized by Noonan, who argued that 
“the assumption of risk by the capitalist does not constitute the essence of the partnership. 
The partnership is essentially constituted by the association of fund and skill for a common 
purpose. Similarly, the assumption of risk by a borrower is not the essence of a loan; a loan 
consists essentially in the borrower’s acquisition of loaned property.”
28 
Because the content of the bull pertained to positive, not natural law, the strictures against the 
triple contract would only apply in those regions that received the bull into law. Though the bull 
did not outlaw the triple contract, it recognized the similarity of this contract to the mutuum and 
in it the potential for abuse, and these opinions were accepted without question. While usury was 
proper to a mutuum, it was not exclusive to it, and the potential use of census contracts, dry 
exchange, or the triple contract to disguise usury is plainly taught by the popes and recognized 
throughout the Catholic world. 
 
Usury and the Theory of the Just Price 
                                                       
27 Quoted in Noonan, p. 220. 
28 Noonan, p. 207.   One point to which Noonan objects to is the connection between the Scholastic theory of 
usury and the theory of the just price. He admits that there is a link between the concept of the 
just price and usury, but argues that “the problem of the just price is treated from an entirely 
different viewpoint than that from which usury is considered.”
29 He argues that the Scholastics 
effectively have two separate theories for two different types of transactions: a theory of usury 
for credit transactions, and a theory of the just price for all other exchanges. While it may be true 
that arguments against usury were not often framed in terms of a just price, his assertion that the 
difference between the two theories is “radical” seems to overstate the matter.
30 In the Summa 
Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas places the question on usury (II-II.78) in his general discussion 
of justice and in the section on sins against commutative justice in particular, immediately 
following the question on cheating (II-II.77). Usury is clearly a sin against commutative justice, 
and the just price is the price that satisfies justice in commutations. In fact, in his question of 
merit (II-II.114), St. Thomas states that “it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything 
received from another,” a statement which logically includes money as well as goods and 
services. This suggests that the two theories are originally and essentially connected and not 
radically different or merely connected by a “thin, tenuous link,”
31 though this is not to deny that 
Scholastic arguments against usury developed along very different lines than theories of the just 
price in other exchanges, which is perhaps Noonan’s essential point. 
 
Conclusion 
  The source of the confusion regarding the Catholic teaching on usury is the changes in the 
practice of confessors that took place between 1820 and 1836. From the perspective of economic 
theory, these changes were entirely justified, as the effects of the Industrial Revolution created an 
abundance of investment, and the abolition of slavery transformed the risk faced by creditors and 
provided them with a valid title to compensation. There would have been no need to justify titles 
to lucrum cessans or damnum emergens by referring to the circumstances of the lender, since 
                                                       
29 Noonan, p. 82. 
30 Noonan, p. 98. 
31 Noonan, p. 82. competitive markets would have meant that the value of these titles could easily be determined 
by market prices, i.e. the “common estimation” of those titles according to the just price theory. 
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   Appendix 
Vix Pervenit  
Encyclical of Pope Benedict XIV promulgated on November 1, 1745.  
To the Venerable Brothers, Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops and Ordinary Clergy of Italy.  
Venerable Brothers, Greetings and Apostolic Benediction.  
Hardly had the new controversy (namely, whether certain contracts should be held valid) come 
to our attention, when several opinions began spreading in Italy that hardly seemed to agree with 
sound doctrine; We decided that We must remedy this. If We did not do so immediately, such an 
evil might acquire new force by delay and silence. If we neglected our duty, it might even spread 
further, shaking those cities of Italy so far not affected.  
Therefore We decided to consult with a number of the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, 
who are renowned for their knowledge and competence in theology and canon law. We also 
called upon many from the regular clergy who were outstanding in both the faculty of theology 
and that of canon law. We chose some monks, some mendicants, and finally some from the 
regular clergy. As presiding officer, We appointed one with degrees in both canon and civil law, 
who had lengthy court experience. We chose the past July 4 for the meeting at which We 
explained the nature of the whole business. We learned that all had known and considered it 
already.  
2. We then ordered them to consider carefully all aspects of the matter, meanwhile searching for 
a solution; after this consideration, they were to write out their conclusions. We did not ask them 
to pass judgment on the contract which gave rise to the controversy since the many documents 
they would need were not available. Rather We asked that they establish a fixed teaching on 
usury, since the opinions recently spread abroad seemed to contradict the Church's doctrine. All 
complied with these orders. They gave their opinions publicly in two convocations, the first of 
which was held in our presence last July 18, the other last August 1; then they submitted their 
opinions in writing to the secretary of the convocation.  
3. Indeed they proved to be of one mind in their opinions.  
I. The nature of the sin called usury has its proper place and origin in a loan contract. This 
financial contract between consenting parties demands, by its very nature, that one return to 
another only as much as he has received. The sin rests on the fact that sometimes the creditor 
desires more than he has given. Therefore he contends some gain is owed him beyond that which 
he loaned, but any gain which exceeds the amount he gave is illicit and usurious.  
II. One cannot condone the sin of usury by arguing that the gain is not great or excessive, but 
rather moderate or small; neither can it be condoned by arguing that the borrower is rich; nor 
even by arguing that the money borrowed is not left idle, but is spent usefully, either to increase 
one's fortune, to purchase new estates, or to engage in business transactions. The law governing loans consists necessarily in the equality of what is given and returned; once the equality has 
been established, whoever demands more than that violates the terms of the loan. Therefore if 
one receives interest, he must make restitution according to the commutative bond of justice; its 
function in human contracts is to assure equality for each one. This law is to be observed in a 
holy manner. If not observed exactly, reparation must be made.  
III. By these remarks, however, We do not deny that at times together with the loan contract 
certain other titles-which are not at all intrinsic to the contract-may run parallel with it. From 
these other titles, entirely just and legitimate reasons arise to demand something over and above 
the amount due on the contract. Nor is it denied that it is very often possible for someone, by 
means of contracts differing entirely from loans, to spend and invest money legitimately either to 
provide oneself with an annual income or to engage in legitimate trade and business. From these 
types of contracts honest gain may be made.  
IV. There are many different contracts of this kind. In these contracts, if equality is not 
maintained, whatever is received over and above what is fair is a real injustice. Even though it 
may not fall under the precise rubric of usury (since all reciprocity, both open and hidden, is 
absent), restitution is obligated. Thus if everything is done correctly and weighed in the scales of 
justice, these same legitimate contracts suffice to provide a standard and a principle for engaging 
in commerce and fruitful business for the common good. Christian minds should not think that 
gainful commerce can flourish by usuries or other similar injustices. On the contrary We learn 
from divine Revelation that justice raises up nations; sin, however, makes nations miserable.  
V. But you must diligently consider this, that some will falsely and rashly persuade themselves-
and such people can be found anywhere-that together with loan contracts there are other 
legitimate titles or, excepting loan contracts, they might convince themselves that other just 
contracts exist, for which it is permissible to receive a moderate amount of interest. Should any 
one think like this, he will oppose not only the judgment of the Catholic Church on usury, but 
also common human sense and natural reason. Everyone knows that man is obliged in many 
instances to help his fellows with a simple, plain loan. Christ Himself teaches this: "Do not 
refuse to lend to him who asks you." In many circumstances, no other true and just contract may 
be possible except for a loan. Whoever therefore wishes to follow his conscience must first 
diligently inquire if, along with the loan, another category exists by means of which the gain he 
seeks may be lawfully attained.  
4. This is how the Cardinals and theologians and the men most conversant with the canons, 
whose advice We had asked for in this most serious business, explained their opinions. Also We 
devoted our private study to this matter before the congregations were convened, while they 
were in session, and again after they had been held; for We read the opinions of these 
outstanding men most diligently. Because of this, We approve and confirm whatever is contained 
in the opinions above, since the professors of Canon Law and Theology, scriptural evidence, the 
decrees of previous popes, and the authority of Church councils and the Fathers all seem to 
enjoin it. Besides, We certainly know the authors who hold the opposite opinions and also those 
who either support and defend those authors or at least who seem to give them consideration. We 
are also aware that the theologians of regions neighboring those in which the controversy had its 
origin undertook the defense of the truth with wisdom and seriousness.  5. Therefore We address these encyclical letters to all Italian Archbishops, Bishops, and priests 
to make all of you aware of these matters. Whenever Synods are held or sermons preached or 
instructions on sacred doctrine given, the above opinions must be adhered to strictly. Take great 
care that no one in your dioceses dares to write or preach the contrary; however if any one should 
refuse to obey, he should be subjected to the penalties imposed by the sacred canons on those 
who violate Apostolic mandates.  
6. Concerning the specific contract which caused these new controversies, We decide nothing for 
the present; We also shall not decide now about the other contracts in which the theologians and 
canonists lack agreement. Rekindle your zeal for piety and your conscientiousness so that you 
may execute what We have given.  
7. First of all, show your people with persuasive words that the sin and vice of usury is most 
emphatically condemned in the Sacred Scriptures; that it assumes various forms and appearances 
in order that the faithful, restored to liberty and grace by the blood of Christ, may again be driven 
headlong into ruin. Therefore, if they desire to invest their money, let them exercise diligent care 
lest they be snatched by cupidity, the source of all evil; to this end, let them be guided by those 
who excel in doctrine and the glory of virtue.  
8. In the second place, some trust in their own strength and knowledge to such an extent that they 
do not hesitate to give answers to those questions which demand considerable knowledge of 
sacred theology and of the canons. But it is essential for these people, also, to avoid extremes, 
which are always evil. For instance, there are some who judge these matters with such severity 
that they hold any profit derived from money to be illegal and usurious; in contrast to them, there 
are some so indulgent and so remiss that they hold any gain whatsoever to be free of usury. Let 
them not adhere too much to their private opinions. Before they give their answer, let them 
consult a number of eminent writers; then let them accept those views which they understand to 
be confirmed by knowledge and authority. And if a dispute should arise, when some contract is 
discussed, let no insults be hurled at those who hold the contrary opinion; nor let it be asserted 
that it must be severely censured, particularly if it does not lack the support of reason and of men 
of reputation. Indeed clamorous outcries and accusations break the chain of Christian love and 
give offense and scandal to the people.  
9. In the third place, those who desire to keep themselves free and untouched by the 
contamination of usury and to give their money to another in such a manner that they may 
receive only legitimate gain should be admonished to make a contract beforehand. In the contract 
they should explain the conditions and what gain they expect from their money. This will not 
only greatly help to avoid concern and anxiety, but will also confirm the contract in the realm of 
public business. This approach also closes the door on controversies-which have arisen more 
than once-since it clarifies whether the money, which has been loaned without apparent interest, 
may actually contain concealed usury.  
10. In the fourth place We exhort you not to listen to those who say that today the issue of usury 
is present in name only, since gain is almost always obtained from money given to another. How 
false is this opinion and how far removed from the truth! We can easily understand this if we 
consider that the nature of one contract differs from the nature of another. By the same token, the things which result from these contracts will differ in accordance with the varying nature of the 
contracts. Truly an obvious difference exists between gain which arises from money legally, and 
therefore can be upheld in the courts of both civil and canon law, and gain which is illicitly 
obtained, and must therefore be returned according to the judgments of both courts. Thus, it is 
clearly invalid to suggest, on the grounds that some gain is usually received from money lent out, 
that the issue of usury is irrelevant in our times.  
11. These are the chief things We wanted to say to you. We hope that you may command your 
faithful to observe what these letters prescribe; and that you may undertake effective remedies if 
disturbances should be stirred up among your people because of this new controversy over usury 
or if the simplicity and purity of doctrine should become corrupted in Italy. Finally, to you and to 
the flock committed to your care, We impart the Apostolic Benediction.  
Given in Rome at St. Mary Major, November 1, 1745, the sixth year of Our Pontificate.  
 
 